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Abstract 
Even though tax evasion has been the focus of a growing volume of research 
in recent years, the issue of its distributional impact is still relatively neglected. 
This paper is an attempt to analyse empirically the implications of tax evasion 
in terms of inequality, poverty, redistribution and progressivity of the income 
tax system in Greece, Hungary and Italy (three countries featuring an extensive 
informal economy). The paper applies the discrepancy method, i.e. compares 
two sets of data, household budget surveys and income tax returns, to derive 
ratios of under-reporting by income source and geographical area. The tax-
benefit model EUROMOD is used to estimate the distributional impact of tax 
evasion comparing household disposable incomes to a full compliance 
counterfactual. 
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1. Introduction 
Even though interest in tax evasion has been growing in recent years, the large volume of 
research generated includes few attempts to study its distributional impact. Yet, tax evasion 
has profound implications for distributional analysis. 
In terms of horizontal equity, individuals with similar income differ in terms of 
inclination and opportunity to under-report it. As a result, tax evasion violates notions of 
fairness and equal treatment, and undermines the idea of reciprocity which lies at the heart 
of the social contract between taxpayers and the state. 
In terms of vertical equity, “if the poor had more opportunity of evading taxes than 
the rich, or were better at it, then the egalitarian policy maker might have good reason to 
smile indulgently on evasion: up to a point anyway” (Cowell, 1987: 195). However, tax 
evasion may soften rather than strengthen the redistributive impact intended by the tax 
schedule. Either way, ignoring tax evasion is likely to cause decision makers and policy 
analysts seriously to misjudge the distributive and fiscal effect of changes in social benefits 
and the tax system. 
On the other hand, tax evasion raises significant issues for efficiency as well. Lower 
tax revenues may ultimately lead to higher tax burdens on those who do pay. Moreover, to 
the extent that opportunities to evade differ by occupation and/or sector of the economy 
(Frederiksen et al., 2005), tax evasion will also distort labour supply decisions – although it 
is not always easy to confirm this assumption empirically (Parker, 2003). 
The aim of this paper is to provide preliminary estimates of the size and distribution 
of income tax evasion in Greece, Hungary and Italy. As discussed in the next section, in all 
three countries the informal economy is widely held to be very extensive, accounting for 
between one-quarter and one-third of official GDP. 
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The structure of the paper is as follows. Section two offers a brief literature review. 
Section three presents data and explains the methodology. Section four reports the results. 
Section five discusses our findings. Section six raises issues for further research. 
 
2. Literature review 
Scholarly interest in tax evasion is growing fast, both in terms of theoretical treatment and 
empirical research. Comprehensive reviews of that literature are offered in Andreoni et al. 
(1998) and Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002), while Slemrod (2007) provides a recent overview 
of what is known about the extent and the determinants of tax evasion. 
This paper draws selectively on that literature. In particular, the deterrence model of 
tax evasion, formulated by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki (1974), assumes 
that rational taxpayers decide how much to evade given their income, the marginal tax 
rate, as well as (crucially) the subjective probability of detection and the penalty rate. While 
the relation between the last two factors has been the focus of research on the optimal 
design of auditing policies, the starting point of our own research is the theoretical insight 
that the level of tax evasion is a negative function of the subjective probability of 
detection. 
Indeed, evidence on cross-sectional variation in non-compliance rates across income 
sources provides some empirical support for the deterrence model. Specifically, there 
seems to be a clear positive correlation between the rate of compliance and the probability 
of detection in the presence of enforcement mechanisms. As Sandmo (2005) noted, since 
wages and salaries are typically reported to tax authorities by employers, under-reporting 
by employees would lead to certain detection. 
In fact, the analysis of US tax audit data collected under the Taxpayer Compliance 
Measurement Program (TCMP) in 1988 demonstrated that the rate of under-reporting of 
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income from dependent employment (0.5%) was much lower than for self-employment 
income (58.6%) (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002). Similar data from the successor to TCMP, 
the National Research Program (NCP), showed that an estimated 57% of self-employment 
income was under-reported, compared to 1% of wages and salaries (Slemrod, 2007). 
These findings are supported by evidence on patterns of non-compliance by income 
source from other countries, or using different research designs (or both). For example, 
Pissarides and Weber (1989) found that the self-employed in Britain spent a higher share 
of their reported income on food (other things such as household characteristics being 
equal), and attributed this to income under-reporting rather than a higher propensity to 
consume food – a finding later replicated by Lyssiotou et al. (2004). Feldman and Slemrod 
(2007) used this insight to analyse the relationship between charitable contributions and 
reported income, and argued that the higher contributions of the self-employed at similar 
levels of reported incomes could only be explained by higher income under-reporting. In 
Italy, Fiorio and D’Amuri (2005) estimated the rate of under-reporting of self-employment 
income around the median of the distribution at 27.7%, compared to 1.9% for income 
from wages and salaries. In Hungary, Krekó and Kiss (2007) highlighted the opportunities 
for (legal) tax avoidance and (illegal) tax evasion available to the self-employed. In Greece, 
Tatsos (2001) found that the self-employed were more likely to participate in unregistered 
activities that remain invisible to the tax authorities.  
Note that what the theory predicts is that the propensity to evade taxes will vary by 
income source, not by employment status. The distinction is clear in the case of employees 
“moonlighting” (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002). Since the probability of detection is lower 
for self-employment income earned in their spare time than it is for wages or salaries from 
their main job, the expected rate of under-reporting will be higher for the former than for 
the latter. 
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While the evidence on patterns of non-compliance by income source seems robust, 
and is supported by unambiguous theoretical predictions, the same cannot be said with 
respect to non-compliance by income class. Even though theoretical models generate no 
clear prediction on the relative strength of income and substitution effects of tax rates on 
compliance, they all indicate that tax evasion should generally rise with income (Andreoni 
et al., 1998). Nevertheless, the empirical evidence is mixed. 
For example, Christian (1994) used data from the 1988 TCMP study to show that, 
relative to the size of their true income, higher-income taxpayers evaded less than those on 
lower incomes. However, his study was seen as inconclusive on methodological grounds: it 
classified as low incomes taxpayers with high permanent income reporting business losses, 
while it failed to account for illegal tax shelters and for non-compliance in partnership and 
corporate tax returns (Slemrod, 2007). Fiorio and D’Amuri (2005) also found that the 
share of unreported income in Italy fell with income. In contrast, Pashardes and 
Polycarpou (2008) showed that, once corrected for tax evasion, the income distribution in 
Cyprus was less equal than the distribution of reported incomes, while Tatsos (2001) 
argued that high earners in Greece were more inclined to non-compliance. 
On the whole, little is known about the level of non-compliance by income class, 
and the available evidence does not always support the hypothesis of a regressive bias of 
tax evasion. 
The trouble with the deterrence model is that it seems to predict more tax evasion 
than is actually observed. While several studies within this intellectual tradition (Sandmo, 
1981; Andreoni et al., 1998; Pestieau et al., 2004; Sandmo, 2005; Slemrod, 2007) attempted 
to resolve this puzzle, others have looked for explanations elsewhere. Behavioural theories 
reject the assumption that tax payers are isolated and amoral individuals, and suggest that 
the decision to evade is greatly influenced by social norms and interactions. Frey (1997), 
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for instance, argued that there is more to tax compliance than simple fear of punishment: 
excessive reliance on extrinsic motivations (such as increased penalties) may ultimately 
crowd out intrinsic ones (e.g. civic virtue). Also, Fortin et al. (2007) tested the assumption 
that individual compliance is influenced by the reporting behaviour of others, and found 
evidence of a fairness effect in terms of horizontal equity: perceived unfairness in taxation 
may lead to increased tax evasion. 
One implication of the theory, the proposition that the propensity to evade taxes 
will inversely correlate with trust in institutions, appears to have intuitive appeal and has in 
fact found support in the literature. Some have attempted to test behavioural models 
drawing on the results of the World Values Survey (WVS), the European Values Survey 
(EVS) or similar surveys. For example, Torgler (2003) and Slemrod (2003) established that 
professed trust in government correlates quite closely with survey-based attitudes towards 
tax evasion, both across countries and across individuals within countries. Furthermore, 
Hanousek and Palda (2004) analysed opinion poll evidence from the Czech Republic 
relating attitudes towards tax evasion to perceived quality of public services, and found that 
a 20% increase in the former could lead to a 13% reduction in the latter. Still, as Slemrod 
(2007) has pointed out, “survey responses may also reflect after-the-fact rationalization of 
noncompliant behaviour”. 
Empirical approaches to estimating the size of informal activities and/or tax evasion 
often rely on relationships between macroeconomic indicators. The most common are the 
demand-for-currency method (Cagan, 1958; Tanzi, 1983; Bhattacharyya, 1990), the 
transactions method (Feige, 1979), the electricity consumption method (Lackó, 2000), and 
the Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) method (Frey and Weck-Hannemann, 
1984; Schneider, 1997; Giles 1997; Dell’Anno et al., 2007). These methods, reviewed by 
Schneider and Ernste (2000) and Schneider and Klinglmair (2004), have been extensively 
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criticized on the grounds that their estimates are sensitive to changes in key parameters 
and are not firmly based on theory (Thomas, 1999; Caridi and Passerini, 2001; Breusch, 
2006; Hanousek and Palda, 2006). 
Another strand of research using microeconomic data relies on the expenditure-based 
method (Pissarides and Weber, 1989; Lyssiotou et al., 2004; Feldman and Slemrod, 2007). 
The method assumes that family expenditure surveys are more reliable on the expenditure 
side rather than on the income side, and use information on the former to estimate under-
reporting of the latter. 
Direct methods include voluntary questionnaire-based sample surveys, trying to elicit 
information on respondents’ non-compliance (Mogensen et al., 1995; Pedersen, 2003), and 
the discrepancy method. The latter focuses on the difference between two alternative and 
independent measurements of the same variable, e.g. comparing income declared for tax 
purposes to that measured by selective checks such as audits. Most of the TCMP/NCP 
studies in the US belong to that category. The analysis of tax returns alongside a general-
purpose income survey may be thought of as an extension of the discrepancy method. 
(Note that the term “discrepancy method” is also used to describe macro studies looking 
at the difference between expenditure and income statistics in national accounts, between 
the official and the actual labour force etc.) 
Our paper builds on previous attempts to estimate the size of the informal economy 
in Greece (Vavouras et al., 1991; Kanellopoulos et al., 1995; Tatsos, 2001), Hungary 
(Krekó and Kiss, 2007; World Bank, 2008; Elek et al., 2009) and Italy (Bordignon and 
Zanardi, 1997; Bernasconi and Marenzi, 1997; Fiorio and D’Amuri, 2005), sometimes in a 
comparative context (Schneider and Enste, 2000; Lackó, 2000; Schneider and Klinglmair, 
2004; Christie et al., 2005; Dell’Anno et al., 2007). According to the resulting estimates, the 
share of the informal economy in the three countries ranges from approximately one-
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quarter to approximately one-third of official GDP. 
Beyond that, our main contribution to the literature is that we link an estimation of 
non-compliance patterns to an analysis of how gains from tax evasion are distributed in 
the general population. Our estimation of the size and incidence of tax evasion in Greece, 
Italy and Hungary relies on the assumption that respondents to an income survey have no 
incentive to conceal their income and are therefore more likely to reveal it truthfully; the 
opposite is the case when individuals fill in their tax return, as tax payers who decide to 
hide part of their income have a good chance of ending up with a higher post-tax income 
than would have been the case under full compliance. 
 
3. Methodology and data 
Our paper applies a variation of the discrepancy method developed by Fiorio and 
D’Amuri (2005), in the sense that we also estimate tax evasion by comparing the tax 
returns and income survey responses of similar individuals. Our approach significantly 
departs from theirs in one significant respect, namely that our estimates of under-reporting 
by level of income are due to a pure composition effect, i.e. result from our application of 
adjustment rates by income source and geographical area to the entire income distribution. 
In other words, we specifically assume that all income from source j earned by residents of 
area i is under-reported at the same rate, regardless of its level. On the contrary, Fiorio and 
D’Amuri estimate under-reporting by income centile (2005: 252). As Mantovani and 
Nienadowska (2007) have shown, adopting the latter approach amounts to implicitly 
assuming away re-ranking effects, which in turn under-estimates the regressive impact of 
tax evasion. 
More specifically, we draw on two sets of data: (a) incomes observed in a household 
budget survey, and (b) incomes reported in tax returns. 
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In the case of Greece, we compare data from the 2004/05 Household Budget 
Survey on 17,400 individuals in 6,600 households, with a sample of unaudited tax returns 
filed in 2005 by 41,300 tax payers in 27,400 tax units. Both sources report incomes earned 
in 2004. 
In the case of Hungary, we compare information on 24,500 individuals in 9,000 
households from the Household Budget Survey, with a random sample of the tax records 
of 228,000 individuals. Both datasets contain information on incomes earned in 2005. 
In the case of Italy, we compare data on 21,100 individuals in 8,000 households from 
the Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth, with aggregate statistics on the 
number of tax payers, taxable income and tax paid as published by the Italian Ministry of 
Finance. Both sources refer to incomes earned in 2002. 
We compare the distribution of income as observed in the survey with a synthetic 
distribution of reported income as revealed to tax authorities, which we have corrected for 
income under-reporting in the light of information derived from tax returns. 
A crucial assumption is that respondents reveal their income to survey interviewers 
more truthfully than they do when filling their tax return. While this assumption has 
intuitive appeal, and is consistent with incentives, all income is known to be measured with 
error. Atkinson et al. (1995) conceptually defined five levels of measuring income (“true 
income”, administrative record income, tax reported income, edited survey income, 
reported survey income), with involuntary measurement error potentially increasing as we 
move from one level to the next. Dhami and Al-Nowaihi (2006) discussed measurement 
error in the context of tax evasion. Rendtel et al. (2004) carefully analysed factors leading 
to misreporting of incomes in surveys. Respondents tend to forget small or irregular 
incomes such as tips and bonuses, and to estimate uncertain incomes (e.g. from self 
employment) conservatively – to which one might add recall error, possibly rising with 
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age. Over-reporting of incomes in surveys relative to tax registers can also happen: 
respondents may confuse net and gross earnings, or ignore tax deductions, while self-
employed workers will report positive incomes in the survey (or negative incomes will be 
edited out of the survey) even when for tax purposes they report negative incomes. 
Moreover, taxable incomes may be under-reported relative to survey incomes for the 
purpose of tax evasion, i.e. voluntarily. Jäntti (2004) found that interview incomes tend on 
average to be lower than register incomes, while non-respondents tend to have lower 
incomes than respondents. On the whole, Rendtel et al. (2004) concluded that “all trends 
will be present to some extent and it is not clear how these trends balance at the end”. 
In this paper, we accept that involuntary measurement error can go either way, but 
rely on the working hypothesis that the various causal factors offset each other, and that 
residual discrepancies between survey incomes and tax reported incomes can be attributed 
to tax evasion alone. Furthermore, we attempt to minimise measurement (and simulation) 
error by defining the reference population narrowly. This is explained below. 
We begin by adjusting income components in the survey in such a way as to mirror 
income as reported to the tax authorities. Here, the main objectives are: (i) ensuring that 
variables are consistently defined across datasets, (ii) identifying the reference population, 
and (iii) obtaining adjustment factors to correct reported incomes for under-reporting with 
a view to evading tax. 
With respect to defining variables consistently, in the survey most or all incomes are 
reported net of taxes and social contributions, while in tax returns most or all are recorded 
in gross terms. In the case of Greece, making income concepts consistent required careful 
treatment of farming and self-employed incomes (reported gross of social contributions in 
the survey), and of wages or salaries and pensions (reported net of social contributions in 
the tax records). Also, in view of the fact that renting out rooms or apartments is often 
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associated with informal activity in tourism, property incomes were merged with incomes 
from self employment. Similar adjustments were made in the other two countries, where 
only incomes from dependent employment and self employment were considered. In the 
case of Hungary, pensioners not reporting labour income were excluded from the sample 
since pensions (as most social benefits) are tax-exempt. In the case of Italy, most property 
income is imputed rent from owner-occupied housing, which is estimated subjectively in 
the survey but is taxed “objectively” according to a standard formula. Moreover, the 
possibility of under-reporting pension incomes with a view to tax evasion was ruled out, 
and differences between the two sources were mostly attributed to respondents 
misclassifying contributory minimum pensions (taxed as income) and non-contributory 
social pensions (not subject to income tax). 
With respect to identifying the reference population, in Greece and Hungary the 
sample of tax returns was made representative of the population of tax payers and was also 
reconciled with the sample of the income survey. Specifically, we reweighted the sample of 
tax returns by occupation and geographical area in terms of population and of average 
household (tax unit) income. Then we reconciled the reweighted sample of tax returns 
with the survey to ensure that the population of tax payers was similar in the two datasets. 
In Italy no adjustments to the tax records could be made, as only aggregate income tax 
statistics were accessible. 
A further adjustment concerned the distinction between income under-reporting 
and tax evasion. In all three countries, the existence of personal allowances (Greece) or tax 
credits (Italy and Hungary) implied that below a certain income level €1 under-reported 
made no difference in terms of tax. In view of that, comparisons between survey incomes 
and incomes reported in tax returns were restricted to the population of tax payers, 
defined as those liable to pay an amount of tax that is greater than zero. Note that – in 
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implicit recognition of, and in an attempt to compensate for, tax evasion – personal 
allowances and tax credits were less generous for the self-employed (Greece and Italy), or 
were only available to employees (Hungary). 
Furthermore, with respect to obtaining adjustment factors needed to correct 
incomes for tax evasion, we allocated the total incomes of the reference population into a 
number of mutually exclusive categories defined as combinations of geographical area and 
income source. Adjustment factors are defined as HBSij
IR
ijij yyα = , where 
IR
ijy  and 
HBS
ijy  
denote the average income from source j earned by residents of geographical area i as 
reported in tax returns and in the survey respectively. 
In all three countries, small rates of over-reporting were actually observed in some 
geographical areas for income from wages and salaries (and, in the case of Greece, for 
pension incomes as well). The corresponding adjustment factors were set equal to one, on 
the grounds that no-one knowingly reports higher incomes in a tax return than in an 
income survey. ( ij1,yy HBSijIRij ∀≤ ). Finally, the adjustment factor for farming income in 
Athens was set equal to 1 minus the average under-reporting rate across geographical areas 
(53.2%) for that income source, as the relevant category was too small in the survey (n=8). 
The resulting adjustment factors by income source and geographical area are shown 
in Table 1. 
 [TABLE 1] 
The implications of income under-reporting in terms of tax evaded and the resulting 
distribution of post-tax household disposable incomes were derived through a comparison 
of our approximation of the real world on the basis of our estimate of income under-
reporting by category, with the counterfactual of full tax compliance using the European 
tax-benefit model EUROMOD (http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/msu/emod/). 
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4. Results 
Our results are summarized in Tables 2-4. 
Table 2 shows our estimated rates of under-reporting by income quantile, defined by 
reference to non-equivalised personal pre-tax incomes. 
[TABLE 2] 
The overall rate of under-reporting is very similar in the three countries (10-12%). 
In Greece, the extent of income under-reporting seems to be largest at the two ends 
of the distribution. Income is mostly concealed from the tax authorities by people in the 
top income decile (about 15%), followed by those in the bottom three income deciles (10-
11%. The rate of under-reporting in the top centile is 24%, and falls somewhat to 19% in 
the top 1‰ of the distribution. 
In Hungary, the estimated rate of under-reporting peaks locally to 10% around 
decile 2, then rises again in the upper half of the distribution to 19% in the top income 
decile. In Italy, income under-reporting appears to increase from 2% to 2.5% in the 
bottom two deciles to almost 7% in decile 5, and then again from around 4% to almost 
21% in the top decile. In both countries, the rate of under-reporting continues to rise 
further up the distribution: to 27% and 30% in the top 1%, and to 39% and 51% in the 
top 1‰, in Italy and Hungary respectively. 
Table 3 presents the fiscal implications of tax evasion, as a comparison of taxable 
income and the resulting tax liability under income under-reporting with the counterfactual 
of full tax compliance. It is worth highlighting our finding that tax evasion reduces the 
income tax yield rather considerably: by 19% in Hungary, by 21% in Italy, and by as much 
as 26% in Greece. 
[TABLE 3] 
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Our estimates of the distributional implications of tax evasion vs. full compliance in 
terms of poverty, inequality, tax progressivity and redistribution (analysed on the basis of 
the distribution of equivalised household disposable income) can be seen in Table 4.  
[TABLE 4] 
Since tax evasion increases post-tax incomes, it is quite likely that median equivalised 
household disposable incomes will rise as well. By implication, the poverty line at 60% of 
median will also go up. In this case, it rises by 1% in Greece and by around 3.5% in Italy 
and Hungary. In response to that, our two poverty indices, headcount rate and poverty 
gap, increase in the case of Greece and Italy (significantly at the 5% level), and decrease in 
the case of Hungary (not significantly at the 5% level). 
In contrast, our five inequality indices (S80/S20, Gini, Atkinson for e=0.5 and e=2, 
and Theil) increase considerably in all three countries, implying that tax evasion results in a 
more unequal income distribution. This effect is especially pronounced with respect to the 
Theil index and the Atkinson index for e=0.5. Finally, our results for the three indices of 
tax progressivity and redistribution estimated here (Kakwani, Reynolds-Smolensky, Suits) 
show that the effects of tax evasion are strongly negative. Specifically, the decline in the 
Kakwani index ranges from 10% to 16%, the reduction in the Suits index from 13.5% to 
22%, while the estimated decrease in the Reynolds-Smolensky index was more dramatic: 
from 23.5% in Greece and 27% in Hungary to 40% in Italy. 
 
5. Discussion 
As shown earlier, the ratio of income from dependent employment that is reported 
in tax records to income from the same source as observed in household budget surveys is 
close to one in all three countries. In contrast, the estimated rate of under-reporting with 
respect to income from self employment ranges from 24% in Greece to 51% in Italy to as 
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much as 71% in Hungary. This is strictly consistent with the literature, as well as with prior 
notions on the different opportunities for tax evasion presented to different occupations. 
Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that under-reporting of wages and salaries is close to 
zero. The standard assumption that it must be negligible because of withholding and 
information provided by employers cannot hold in the case of collusion – i.e. when 
employers and employees agree to conceal all or part of wages paid in order to reduce 
both employers’ labour costs and workers’ take-home pay. 
In fact, empirical evidence suggests the existence in all three countries of a large 
shadow economy centred on precarious, unregistered, informal jobs (petits boulots). In 
Greece, the Inspectorate Service of the Social Insurance Foundation IKA estimated that 
employers in 10% of all firms inspected in 2008 failed to pay social contributions, while 
27% of all workers remained unregistered (press release, 25 January 2009). In Hungary, a 
recent study estimated the share of unregistered employment at 17% of the labour force, 
while more than half of employees reporting earning at the minimum wage in 2003 in fact 
received about one-third of their actual pay in a “brown envelope” (Elek et al. 2009). In 
Italy, an inspection of 145,000 firms by the National Institute of Social Protection INPS 
showed that in 2003 approximately 63% of firms used irregular payment methods such as 
“pay on the side”, while the National Statistical Service ISTAT estimated the size of 
irregular labour force at 14% (cited in Fiorio and D’Amuri 2005: 255). In all three 
countries, such “informal” practices were particularly widespread in construction, retail 
trade, tourism, contracted-out services such as cleaning and catering and so on. 
We think there are three reasons we failed to detect much under-reporting of wages 
and salaries earned by the informally employed. To start with, a large proportion of those 
concerned belong to ethnic minorities and other disadvantaged groups (illegal immigrants, 
the Roma) who tend to be under-represented in household budget surveys. On the other 
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hand, tax records are truncated, either in the sense that unregistered workers by definition 
are invisible to tax authorities, or because those earning below a very low level (€3,000 a 
year in Greece) are legally exempt from the obligation to fill in a tax return, or because in 
order to compute adjustment rates we deliberately restricted our analysis to those liable to 
pay an amount of tax that is greater than zero. Thirdly, following up on the last point, 
given that our original samples of tax records and of household budget survey data were 
drawn from different populations, as a consequence of which a considerable amount of 
reweighting had to be done, it is possible that some variability was smoothed out in the 
process. 
As explained before, our results are driven by estimates of under-reporting and the 
resulting adjustment rates by income source and geographical area. All other results are 
due to a pure composition effect. This is clearly true for our finding of non-compliance by 
income class, which suggests something between a U- and a J-shape pattern. Specifically, it 
appears that the rate of under-reporting is higher at low incomes than at middle income 
levels (except in Italy), and is highest at top incomes. Since, by design, under-reporting was 
not allowed to vary by income class, this result is entirely due to the concentration of wage 
and salary earners in the middle of the income distribution, combined with the strong 
presence of self-employed professionals at the top. 
As discussed earlier, the available evidence on the relation between tax evasion and 
income class is mixed. In particular, beyond the literature reviewed in the relevant section, 
our finding that tax evasion is more prevalent at high incomes finds some extra support in 
the results of the 1999 values survey jointly conducted by WVS and EVS – at least insofar 
as survey-based attitudes towards tax evasion reflect actual behaviour. In that survey, the 
share of respondents agreeing with the statement “cheating on tax if you have the chance 
is never justified” was greater at low- than at high-income levels in all three countries. 
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Incidentally, the same was true elsewhere (e.g. in Germany and the US). The survey also 
shows that variation in attitudes towards tax evasion across countries is very wide indeed 
(http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org). 
Clearly, the implications of a given rate of under-reporting at low levels of income 
are very different from those of the same rate further up the income distribution, and not 
just because of the difference between relative and absolute terms. Because of progressive 
income taxation and significant tax-free allowances or tax credits for low earners with 
dependants, the effects of income under-reporting at low income levels in terms of unpaid 
tax are pretty minimal. In contrast, extensive under-reporting among high earners has a 
considerable impact on inequality and on the progressivity of the income tax system, and 
translates into sizeable losses in terms of tax receipts. 
Using the tax-benefit model EUROMOD enabled us to compute the distributional 
and fiscal effects of tax evasion, by simulating tax due under tax evasion and under full tax 
compliance and by comparing the outputs. This produced a series of interesting results. To 
start with, we found that the progressive structure of income taxation and the distribution 
of tax payers along the taxable income scale heighten the fiscal effects of under-reporting. 
More specifically, as shown in Table 3, income under-reporting by 10% to 12% results in a 
shortfall in terms of tax receipts of around 20% (Hungary and Italy) up to 26% (Greece). 
Distributional effects may be seen as rather predictable, given the pattern of under-
reporting by level of income discussed above. However, this is less true than it may appear. 
The results shown in Table 4 were computed on the basis of the distribution of equivalised 
household disposable income, while the results shown in Table 2 relied on the distribution 
of non-equivalised personal pre-tax incomes instead. 
In spite of this important difference, we find that tax evasion causes inequality to 
rise relative to what would have been the case under full tax compliance. The estimated 
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effect of tax evasion on inequality is highest for indices that are more sensitive to changes 
at high levels of income. Finally, the effects on tax progressivity and redistribution are 
estimated to be considerable, strongly suggesting that tax evasion renders the income tax 
system more regressive than its formal structure implies. 
 
6. Conclusion  
As shown above, the effects of tax evasion in Greece, Hungary and Italy seem to be 
higher income inequality and lower tax progressivity, as well as a significant loss of tax 
receipts. This is a strong finding, but is it to be trusted? 
A cause for caution regards the distinction between static and dynamic effects of tax 
evasion. It is important to remember that taxation (and, by implication, tax evasion) does 
not simply reduce disposable incomes; it also affects decisions concerning supply of, and 
demand, for labour, the allocation of disposable income between consumption and 
savings, the allocation of consumption between different goods and services and so on 
(Slemrod and Yitzhaki 2002, Sandmo 2005). Although the analysis of such dynamic effects 
lies well beyond the scope of this paper, we need to recognise that the implications of tax 
evasion exceed what we can show with a static arithmetical recalculation of the income 
distribution. 
On a related point, while our approach focuses on the effects of income tax evasion, 
the distributional impact of evading other taxes (e.g. company tax, capital tax, value added 
tax) is likely to reinforce these effects. The case of social contributions, often evaded at the 
same time as income taxes, deserves a comment. Two effects operate here. On the one 
hand, social contributions are paid at a flat rate in the case of employer and employee 
contributions, or as a lump sum in the case of self-employed contributions, and they are 
payable from the first €1 earned (i.e. no lower earnings threshold typically applies). As a 
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result of that, the distributional impact of evasion may be less regressive for social 
contributions than it is for income tax. On the other hand, employer social contributions 
are formally higher than employee contributions (twice as high in Greece, three times as 
high in Hungary and Italy), as a result of which unregistered work and incomplete 
reporting of wages will reduce employers’ labour costs far more than will raise take-home 
workers’ incomes. Recall also that, as recognised by (Slemrod, 2007), the presence of tax 
evasion calls into question the standard result that the incidence of taxes does not in the 
long run depend on which side of the labour market payroll taxes are levied. On balance, 
taking both effects into account, we think that evasion of social contributions is more 
likely to reinforce than mitigate the regressive impact of tax evasion. 
Our approach relies on matching data from tax returns with income survey data. 
While we have made a serious effort to make the two sources comparable, our adjustment 
techniques offer at best good approximations. In particular, the truncated nature of tax 
records (i.e. low-income families pay no taxes) and the limited reliability of income 
statistics at either end of the income scale may cause residual estimation errors. Therefore, 
our results should be seen as tentative estimates under an experimental research design. 
Clearly, the design itself can be improved further, e.g. by trying other approaches to 
matching the two databases, by repeating the analysis with a larger sample of tax returns, 
or by collecting more information, enabling us to create smaller, more homogeneous 
categories. 
A possible refinement concerns the introduction of stochastic variation. Specifically, 
there is no reason to think that all members of a given category under-report their 
incomes by the same ratio: some will report less, some more, some others may even 
faithfully reveal their incomes to the tax authorities. This would be consistent with the 
literature: a TCMP study found that among taxpayers with reported income between 
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$50,000 and $100,000 in 1988, 60% understated tax, 14% overstated it, and 26% reported 
tax correctly (Christian, 1994). Stochastic variation involves introducing a random term 
around an average rate of under-reporting by category. Again, this exceeds the scope of 
the current paper. 
Our key assumption is to treat incomes observed in the household budget survey as 
closer approximations of “true income”, on the grounds that people have no incentive to 
conceal their income from survey interviewers, since their disposable income would not be 
affected by their response. The intuition – reflected in similar approaches taken in other 
studies (Fiorio and D’Amuri, 2005) – is reasonable, but not necessarily correct. The role of 
measurement error, introducing indeterminacy and calling for a healthy dose of scepticism, 
was discussed above. Quite apart from that, there are at least two reasons to suspect that 
the actual but unknown level of tax evasion may be considerably higher than that implied 
by our estimates. 
On the one hand, while our approach attempts to capture income under-reporting, 
in the sense of individuals reporting a lower figure in their tax return, some tax evasion is 
also caused by individuals who decline to file a tax return altogether. On the other hand, 
there is evidence (Elffers et al., 1987) that the very same factors causing tax evasion (low 
trust, low tax morale and so on), combined with the wish of tax-evading individuals to be 
somehow “consistent”, may cause under-reporting of incomes in surveys as well, albeit at a 
lower level. To the extent that these factors are at work here, our estimates of tax evasion 
will be biased downwards. That would be consistent with the reflection of Schneider and 
Enste (2000), that “it is unlikely that [direct methods] capture all shadow activities, so they 
can be seen as lower-bound estimates”. 
A final word concerns the nature of our research. Even though the design of our 
work was experimental, the assumptions we have had to rely upon were sometimes crude, 
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and several issues (some of which discussed here) remain unresolved, we believe our 
results capture essential aspects of the problem we set out to explore. Our core finding, 
that tax evasion in Greece, Hungary and Italy has a regressive impact, seems reasonably 
robust. While we have not addressed the question of the optimal design of tax auditing 
policies, our results suggest that the payoff of efforts to reduce tax evasion could be very 
substantial indeed: higher tax receipts, lower poverty, reduced inequality, and a more 
progressive tax system. 
After all, it may be that the “egalitarian policy maker” invoked by Cowell (1987) has 
little reason to “smile indulgently on evasion”, and every reason actively to engage in a 
sustained effort to reduce it. How this could be achieved is another story altogether. 
 21
References 
Allingham M.G. and Sandmo A. (1972) Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis. Journal of 
Public Economics vol.1, pp.323-338. 
Andreoni J., Erard B. and Feinstein J. (1998) Tax compliance. Journal of Economic Literature 
vol. 36, pp. 818-860. 
Atkinson A.B., Rainwater L. and Smeeding T.M. (1995) Income distribution in OECD countries: 
evidence from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). Paris: OECD. 
Bernasconi M. and Marenzi A. (1997) Gli effetti distributivi dell’evasione fiscale in Italia. 
Ricerche quantitative per la politica economica. CIDE-SADIBA, Banca d’Italia. 
Bhattacharyya D. (1990) An econometric method of estimating the ‘‘hidden’’ economy, 
United Kingdom (1960-1984): estimates and tests. Economic Journal vol.100, pp.703-
717. 
Bordignon M. and Zanardi A. (1997) Tax evasion in Italy. Giornale degli Economisti e Annali 
di Economia vol. 56, no. 3-4, pp. 169-210. 
Breusch T. (2006) Book review of C. Bajada and F. Schneider (eds) “Size, causes and 
consequences of the underground economy: an international perspective” 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005). Economic Record pp.492-494. 
Cagan P. (1958) The demand for currency relative to the total money supply. Journal of 
Political Economy vol.6, no.3, pp.302-328. 
Caridi P. and Passerini P. (2001) The underground economy, the demand for currency 
approach and the analysis of discrepancies: some recent European experience. Review 
of Income and Wealth vol.47, pp.239-250. 
Christian C.W. (1994) Voluntary compliance with the individual income tax: results from 
the 1988 TCMP study. IRS Research Bulletin 1993/1994, Publication 1500, pp.35–42. 
Washington DC: Internal Revenue Service. 
Christie E., Holzner M. and Lackó M. (2005) Taxation and the shadow economy in Europe. The 
Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies. 
Cowell F. (1987) The economic analysis of tax evasion. In: Surveys in the economics of 
uncertainty (edited by J.D. Hey and P.J. Lambert). Blackwell. 
Dell’Anno R., Gómez-Antonio M. and Angel P. (2007) The shadow economy in three 
Mediterranean countries: France, Spain and Greece; a MIMIC approach. Empirical 
Economics vol.33 pp.51–84. 
Dhami S. and Al-Nowaihi A. (2006) A simple model of optimal tax systems: taxation, 
 22
measurement and uncertainty. The Manchester School vol.74, no.6, pp.645–669. 
Elek P., Scharle A., Szabó B. and Szabó P.A. (2009) Employment in the black economy in 
Hungary. In: The shadow economy (edited by A. Semjén and I.J. Tóth). MTA-KTI, 
Budapest (in Hungarian). 
Elffers H., Weigel R.H. and Dick J. (1987) The consequences of different strategies for 
measuring tax evasion behaviour. Journal of Economic Psychology vol. 8, pp. 311-337. 
Feige E. (1979) How big is the irregular economy? Challenge vol.22, pp.5-13. 
Feldman N. and Slemrod J. (2007) Estimating tax noncompliance with evidence from 
unaudited tax returns. Economic Journal vol.117, pp.327-352. 
Fiorio C.V. and D’Amuri F. (2005) Workers’ tax evasion in Italy. Giornale degli Economisti e 
Annali di Economia vol. 64, no. 2/3, pp. 241-264. 
Frederiksen A., Graversen E.K. and Smith N. (2005) Tax evasion and work in the 
underground sector. Labour Economics vol.12, pp.613-628. 
Fortin B., Lacroix G. and Villeval M.-C. (2007) Tax evasion and social interactions. Journal 
of Public Economics vol.91, no. 11-12, pp. 2089-2112. 
Frey B.S. (1997) A constitution for knaves crowds out civic virtues. Economic Journal 
vol.107, no.443, pp.1043–1053. 
Frey B.S. and Weck-Hannemann H. (1984) The hidden economy as an “unobserved” 
variable. European Economic Review vol.26, no.1, pp.33-53. 
Hanousek J. and Palda F. (2004) Quality of government services and the civic duty to pay 
taxes in the Czech and Slovak Republics, and other transition countries. Kyklos 
vol.57, no.2, pp.237–252. 
Hanousek J. and Palda F. (2006) Problems measuring the underground economy in 
transition. Economics of Transition vol.14, pp.707-718. 
Jäntti M. (2004) The effect of measurement errors, non-response and attrition on income 
inequality, poverty and mobility. In: Harmonisation of panel surveys and data quality 
(edited by M Ehling and U. Rendtel). Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt. 
Kanellopoulos K., Kousoulakos I. and Rapanos B. (1995) Shadow economy and tax evasion: 
estimates and economic implications. Athens: Centre of Planning and Economic Research 
(in Greek). 
Krekó J. and Kiss G.P. (2007) Tax evasion and the Hungarian tax system. Budapest: Hungarian 
National Bank (in Hungarian). 
Lackó M. (2000) Hidden economy: an unknown quantity? Comparative analysis of hidden 
 23
economies in transition countries, 1989-95. Economics of Transition vol.8, pp.117-149. 
Lyssiotou P., Pashardes P. and Stengos T. (2004) Estimates of the black economy based 
on consumer demand approaches. Economic Journal vol. 114, pp. 622-640. 
Mantovani D. and Nienadowska S. (2007) The distributive impact of tax evasion in Italy. 
Materiali di discussione no.575, Dipartimento di Economia Politica, Università degli 
Studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia. 
Mogensen G.V., Kvist H.K., Körmendi E. and Pedersen S. (1995) The shadow economy in 
Denmark 1994: measurement and results. Study no.3, Copenhagen: The Rockwool 
Foundation Research Unit. 
Parker S. (2003) Does tax evasion affect occupational choice’ Oxford Bulletin of Economics and 
Statistics vol.65, pp.379-394. 
Pashardes P. and Polycarpou A. (2008) Income tax evasion, inequality and poverty. Cyprus 
Economic Policy Review vol.2, no.2, pp.37-49. 
Pedersen S. (2003) The shadow economy in Germany, Great Britain and Scandinavia: a measurement 
based on questionnaire service. Study no.10, Copenhagen: The Rockwool Foundation 
Research Unit. 
Pestieau P., Possen U.M. and Slutsky S.M. (2004) Joint optimal taxes and enforcement 
policies in response to tax evasion. Journal of Public Economic Theory vol.6, pp.337-374. 
Pissarides C.A. and Weber G. (1989) An expenditure-based estimate of Britain’s black 
economy. Journal of Public Economics vol. 39, pp. 17-32. 
Rendtel U., Nordberg L., Jäntti M., Hanish J. and Basic E. (2004) Report on quality of income 
data. CHINTEX WP no.21. 
Sandmo A. (1981) Income tax evasion, labour supply, and the equity-efficiency tradeoff. 
Journal of Public Economics vol.16, pp.265-288. 
Sandmo A. (2005) The theory of tax evasion: a retrospective view. National Tax Journal vol. 
LVIII, no. 4, pp. 643-663. 
Schneider F. (1997) Empirical results for the size of the shadow economy of Western European 
countries over time. Discussion Paper no.9710, Linz University. 
Schneider F. and Ernste D. (2000) Shadow economies: size, causes and consequences. 
Journal of Economic Literature vol.38, pp.77-114. 
Schneider F. and Klinglmair R. (2004) Shadow economies around the world: what do we know? 
CESifo Working Paper no. 1167 and IZA Discussion Paper no. 1043. 
Slemrod J. (2003) Trust in Public Finance. In: Public finance and public policy in the new century 
 24
(edited by S. Cnossen and H.-W. Sinn). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Slemrod J. (2007) Cheating ourselves: the economics of tax evasion. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives vol.21, no.1, pp.25-48. 
Slemrod J. and Yitzhaki S. (2002) Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration. In: Hnadbook 
of Public Economics (edited by A.J. Auerbach and M. Feldstein). Elsevier. 
Tanzi V. (1983) The underground economy in the United States: annual estimates, 1930-
1980. IMF Staff Papers vol.30, no.2, pp.283-305. 
Tatsos N. (2001) Shadow economy and tax evasion in Greece. IOBE, Athens (in Greek). 
Thomas J. (1999) Quantifying the black economy: measurement without theory yet again. 
Economic Journal vol.109, pp.F381–387. 
Torgler B. (2003) Tax morale, rule-governed behaviour, and trust. Constitutional Political 
Economy vol.14, no.2, pp.119–140. 
Vavouras G., Karavitis N. and Tsouhlou L. (1991) Shadow economy, a direct estimation method of 
the size of the shadow economy and its application in the case of Greece. Athens: Kritiki (in 
Greek). 
World Bank (2008). Reducing undeclared employment in Hungary: synthesis report of the World Bank 
study. Washington DC. 
Yitzhaki S. (1974) A note on ‘income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis’. Journal of Public 
Economics vol.3, no.2, pp.201–202. 
 25
Tables 
 
TABLE 1 
Adjustment factors by income source and geographical area 
 
wages and 
salaries 
pensions 
self 
employment 
farming 
Greece     
Athens 1.000 1.000 0.770 0.468 
Northern 0.978 1.000 0.860 0.412 
Southern 0.992 1.000 0.640 0.530 
Islands 1.000 1.000 0.712 0.519 
Hungary     
Central 0.960 n.a. 0.211 n.a. 
Transdanubia 1.000 n.a. 0.288 n.a. 
Great Plain and North 0.990 n.a. 0.342 n.a. 
Italy     
North West 0.985 n.a. 0.512 n.a. 
North East 1.000 n.a. 0.472 n.a. 
Central 1.000 n.a. 0.405 n.a. 
Southern (incl. Islands) 1.000 n.a. 0.466 n.a. 
Note: The adjustment factors shown here, multiplied by survey incomes, are used to derive 
the distribution of reported incomes, i.e. those incomes assumed to be revealed to tax 
authorities and hence subject to income tax. 
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TABLE 2 
Under-reporting by level of income 
 Greece Hungary Italy 
decile 1 (poorest) 9.9% 4.3% 2.6% 
decile 2 10.4% 10.2% 2.0% 
decile 3 11.2% 6.8% 5.0% 
decile 4 5.1% 5.0% 6.5% 
decile 5 5.7% 5.8% 6.7% 
decile 6 7.0% 8.3% 4.1% 
decile 7 7.9% 8.2% 5.5% 
decile 8 7.3% 8.5% 7.6% 
decile 9 6.8% 12.0% 10.7% 
decile 10 (richest) 14.7% 19.2% 20.8% 
top 1% 23.6% 29.6% 26.5% 
top 0.1% 19.3% 51.2% 39.5% 
total 9.9% 11.4% 11.4% 
Notes: Rates of under-reporting are computed as difference of survey income from reported 
income divided by survey income. 
Reported incomes, defined as incomes revealed to tax authorities, have been adjusted 
for under-reporting using the adjustment factors by geographical area and income 
source shown in Table 1. 
Income quantiles are constructed on the basis of the distribution of non-equivalised 
personal pre-tax incomes. 
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TABLE 3 
Fiscal implications of tax evasion vs. full compliance 
 Greece Hungary Italy 
reported income -9.9% -10.9% -11.7% 
taxable income -10.3% … -12.3% 
tax due -26.1% -19.4% -20.6% 
disposable income +2.7% +7.7% +6.1% 
Notes: Proportional change in income and tax variables is defined as difference of full 
compliance from tax evasion divided by full compliance. 
Income and tax variables are derived by running the tax-benefit model EUROMOD 
under the two assumptions of tax evasion and full compliance. 
Tax evasion provides estimates of income tax variables assuming incomes are under-
reported to tax authorities as implied by the adjustment factors shown in Table 1. 
Full compliance provides estimates of the same variables assuming incomes are 
reported to tax authorities as observed in the survey. 
Income and tax variables are expressed in terms of non-equivalised personal incomes. 
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TABLE 4 
Distributional implications of tax evasion vs. full compliance 
 Greece Hungary Italy 
poverty line (€ p.a.) +1.0% +3.4% +3.7% 
poverty rate (FGT α=0) +2.3% -1.5% +3.8% 
poverty gap (FGT α=1) +1.6% -2.8% +4.6% 
Gini +3.5% +6.8% +5.5% 
S80/S20 +5.2% +7.5% +2.6% 
Atkinson (e=0.5) +7.2% +17.9% +11.5% 
Atkinson (e=2) +2.7% +7.6% +4.0% 
Theil +9.2% +24.5% +14.3% 
Kakwani -10.0% -10.8% -16.1% 
Reynolds-Smolensky -23.5% -26.9% -40.0% 
Suits -16.2% -13.5% -22.4% 
Notes: Proportional change in distributional indices is defined as difference of full 
compliance from tax evasion divided by full compliance, as explained in Table 3. 
Distributional indices are derived on the basis of equivalised household disposable 
incomes. 
The poverty line is set at 60% of median equivalised household disposable income, 
and is recalculated under full compliance and tax evasion. 
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Appendix 
 
TABLE A.1 
Income tax brackets and marginal tax rates 
 
income brackets (€ p.a.) 
tax rate 
from to 
Greece (2004) 0 8,400 0% 
 8,400 13,400 15% 
 13,400 23,400 30% 
 23,400  40% 
Hungary (2005) 0 6,046 18% 
 6,046  38% 
Italy (2002) 0 10,329 18% 
 10,329 15,493 24% 
 15,493 30,987 32% 
 30,987 69,721 39% 
 69,721  45% 
Notes: In Greece, the personal allowance (i.e. the income bracket where the tax rate is zero) 
was set at €10,000 for employees or pensioners. The personal allowance was higher 
by €1,000 for tax payers with one child, by €2,000 for those with two children, and by 
€10,000 for tax payers with three or more children. 
In Hungary, tax credits for employees (worth up to €496 for earnings up to €4,030) 
ensured that those on the minimum wage paid no income tax. No tax credits were 
available for the self-employed. 
In Italy, tax credits were available for employees (worth up to €1,147 for incomes up 
to €6,197, with additions for those partly employed in the course of the year and/or 
employed in temporary jobs), for pensioners (as above, with additions rising with age), 
for the self-employed (worth up to €573 for incomes up to €4,700), for children and 
other dependent members of the household etc. 
In all three countries, various other tax allowances and tax credits are applicable (and, 
where possible, have been simulated in EUROMOD). 
 
